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NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little
Ian A. Laird*

Before a Vancouver, British Columbia courthouse, on a cool mid-winter day in
February of 2001, the forces of anti-globalization arrayed themselves to protest

outside the judicial review proceedings of the North American Free Trade
Agreement' ("NAFTA") Chapter 11 case Metalclad Y Mexico.! One activist told a
reporter, "This case highlights how an international trade agreement like NAFTA
threatens democracy. 3 The public interest in the Metalclad arbitration makes it clear
that NAFTA Chapter 11 will continue to be the poster child for civil society activists
in their anti-free trade attacks.
Days later, before ajoint session of the Canadian Senate and Parliament, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair made an impassioned plea for rational argument in the
globalization debate. Blair told Parliament.
I think it is time we started to argue vigorously and dearly as to why free trade is
right. It is the key to jobs for our people, to prosperity, and actually to development
in the poorest parts of the world. The case against it is misguided, and worse, unfir,
and however sincere the protests they cannot be allowe to stand in the way of
rational argument. We should start to make this case with force and determination.
The success of the anti-Multi-Lateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") forces
in the spring of 1998, and the events of Seattle in December 1999, have emboldened
anti-free traders and arguably forced the debate to a level of hyperbole that has made
Blair's appeal to reason timely. The success of anti-free trade activists has apparently
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spooked the Canadian government into defensive positions about their support for
the promotion of international trade and investment. Canadian Trade Minister Pierre
Pettigrew recently re-confirmed his "preoccupation" with Chapter 11 and the policy
position that Canada will no longer include Chapter 11-like investment protection
provisions in future trade agreements such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas
("FTAA"). This political shortsightedness is evidence of governments succumbing to
a Seattle induced hysteria, rather than arguing the benefits of an open trade and
investment rules-based system.
The story of Chicken Little6 comes to mind because, like with all children s
fables, it embodies real life lessons. Just as Chicken Little sought the answer to his
baseless fear in authority, by searching for the King to attend to his problems, this
paper is a brief attempt to appeal to some measure of reason.
The issues that have generated the most smoke, if not real heat, concerning
international investment provisions like NAFTA Chapter 11 are those of
expropriation and the transparency of NAFTA tribunal proceedings. A key element
of the Metalclad decision that Mexico is seeking to set aside in British Columbia is the
expropriation provision in NAFTA Article 1110.
The question this article will try to address: is the sky falling or should we just
remember to look up when we walk under acorn trees.
I. NEW AND UNCERTAIN

The main reason that there is a lack of understanding about NAFTA Chapter
11 and other investment treaties, such as Bilateral Investment Treaties, is that they
include rather arcane substantive trade provisions developed over a hundred years of
international arbitration. Novelty has also come as a result of the fact that Chapter 11
is a new remedy for investors to make claims against governments in their own names,
rather than through traditional diplomatic methods and politics. This is the element
of NAFTA Chapter 11 that has irritated the Canadian and US governments the
most. They do not like being told that international law means something other than
what politics dictates.
The main response of government officials who negotiated Chapter 11, or act on
the government side of disputes, is that "we did not intend NAFTA to mean that".
What they are really saying is that Chapter 11 was intended to protect Canadian and
US investments from arbitrary or discriminatory conduct of the Mexican government,
and that Canada and the US should never attract claims. They never thought that
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their own governments might violate international treatment obligations. What they
are now seeking is a NAFTA i La carte, suited to their own political interests.
Another aspect of NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations that is obscuring and
feeding the hyperbole is the nature of international arbitration itself. Traditionally the
domain of the monks of international diplomacy, the outside world has only just
recently begun to glimpse through a slightly opened doorway to see how these
processes work. To give the NAFTA governments credit, in particular the United
States and Canada, efforts are being made to provide more information to the public
and more transparency in the process.
it should be remembered, however, that Investor-State dispute resolution
mechanisms that govern NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations, such as the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") and United Nations Centre
for International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") arbitration rules, were created to
remove investment disputes from the heated political arena of state-to-state
controversy to the cooler, and hopefully elevated, climes of an expert international
tribunal. It is now somewhat difficult for governments to backtrack and make these
arbitral proceedings more open.
In addition to the newness of the Chapter 11 remedy, part of the uncertainty
stems from the fact that there have only been a few substantive decisions which have
generated a great deal of discussion. The Metaldad decision is the only complete
NAFTA Chapter 11 decision to date in which the tribunal decided in favor of the
investor on the question of expropriation, and made an award of compensation. Two
other decisions, SD Myers' and Pope & Talbot,8 have included substantive judicial
statements on expropriation but were decided against the claimants on the facts.
There were many dire predictions in the early days after the signing of NAFTA
that there would be an avalanche of Investor-State claims. This has nor come to pass.
In the seven plus years since NAFTA came into force onJanuary 1, 1994, only sixteen
NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations have been initiated,' and of those, only two
decisions have been made against NAFTA Parties, in the SD Myers and Metaclad
cases. The anti-trade interests have continued to make the "avalanche" argument, but
the record speaks for itself. NAFTA Chapter 11 is a relatively limited, although
7. SD Myers v Canada, Partial Award of Nov 13, 2000, available online at
<http://www.appletonlaw.com/cases/Myers-Final Merits Awardpdf.> (visited Mar 25, 2001). The
investor, however, was successful on the grounds of national treatmenr and the international

minimum standard of treatment. The arbitration has proceeded to a damages phase.
8. Pope & Talbot, Inc v Canada, Interim Award (June 26, 2000) availble online at
<http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm> (visited on Mar 25,2001).
9. Against Canada: Signa SA., Ethyl Corp, SD Myers, Inc, Pope & Taltot, Irr, Sunt.zt Im United Parcel
Service, Ketcham Investments, Inc Against Mexico: Azinian et al, Waste Marajcmwt Cerp, MaHd
Corp, Karpa, Adams et al; Against the United States: Loewen, Mondev Intl Lid, Meearex Carp, ADF
Group,Inc. See <http://www.naftadaims.com> (visited Mar 23,2001).
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powerful in the correct circumstances, legal remedy that has not turned out to be the
scourge against state sovereignty many continue to believe it will be.
II. EXPROPRIATION AND THE HARD CASE
The biggest acorn falling on the anti-trade chicken littles is what I call the "hard
case" of expropriation under Chapter 11. The flashpoint in government discussion has
been the term "tantamount to expropriation" included under NAFTA Article
1110(1). Both the SD Myers and Pope & Talbot tribunals were in agreement that the
term means no more than the "equivalent to" and does not import new law into
NAFTA.'°
The "tantamount to expropriation" debate has been a bit of a red herring,
diverting attention from the real debate on the question of whether a nondiscriminatory general regulatory measure, a measure promulgated under a state's
"police powers", can be considered an expropriation that must be compensated.
The
debate on this issue slides on a continuum. At one end, the advocates of state
unrestrained sovereignty say that a police power measure should never be
compensated. In other words, governments have free reign and should not be
accountable for discriminatory or arbitrary acts.
Other international commentators take the middle position that even if the
measure is a general regulatory measure, at the minimum, if that measure is
discriminatory or arbitrary, or a disguised restriction on investment or trade, an
expropriation is compensable. This type of argument is reflected in GATT Article
XX(b)." NAFTA Article 1101(4), titled "Scope and Coverage", arguably could
provide a similar balancing of interests, although the expropriation provisions would
still be applicable."
At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that the black letter of
NAFTA Article 1110(1) is effectively a no-fault provision and that police powers
measures are compensable. A plain reading of NAFTA Article 1110(1) supports the
position that it is in fact a no-fault provision. The tribunal in Pope & Talbot held that
NAFTA Article 1110 "does cover non-discriminatory regulation that might be said to
10. SD Myers at para 286, citing Pope & Talbot at para 104 (cited in note 7).
11. "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ...(b)
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade Article XX, May 1952, 1 GATT BISD 48-50.
12. "Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Partyfrom providing a service or performing afunction
such as law enforcement, correctional services, income security or insurance, social security or

insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care, in a manner that isnot
inconsistent with this Chapter." NAFTA at Art 1110, para 4 (emphasis added) (cited in note 1).
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fall within an exercise of a state's so-called police powers."" Citing with approval the
Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the US, section 712, comment (g), the
Pope tribunal then continues by stating, 'Indeed, much creeping expropriation could
be conducted by regulation, and a blanket exception for regulatory measures would
create a gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation."' The
tribunal in the SD Myers NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration was more cautious, but
generally supportive of the Pope & Talbot tribunal's view of expropriation.'

III. THE HARD CASE
The troublesome hard case is this: If NAFTA Article 1110 is a no-fault
provision, then the worry is that investors who are adversely impacted by these bona
fide government environmental or health measures would force governments to pay
for investor losses even if the investment has caused injury to people.
For example, an investor has been selling a popular product through its foreign
investment enterprise for years that has recently been scientifically proven to be
hazardous to human health. The government then decides to make a health
regulation to eliminate the product. The investor loses his whole investment as a
result of the government measure. The questions from the hard case are: (1) could the
investor bring a NAFTA claim, (2) would it bring a NAFTA claim, and (3) could it
even receive compensation? If the product or investment is genuinely a health or
environmental hazard, the answer is that it is unlikely the investor could or would
bring a claim, nor would it likely be able to collect any damages.
To bring a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim, there are numerous procedural and
jurisdictional requirements to be met. The main requirements are that. (1) there must
be an "investor" with an "investment", (2) there must be a government "measure", (3)
the measure must constitute a breach of a substantive NAFTA treatment obligation,
such as expropriation or national treatment, and (4) that breach must have caused
damage to the investor and its investment. In addition, there exist time limitations,
waiver and consent requirements for an investor to bring a claim. Requirements (1)
and (2) have fairly broad application within NAFTA and can be relatively easily met.
Meeting the treatment and damages requirements is a more difficult prospect.
13. Pope & Talbot at para 96 (cited in note 7).
14. Id at para 99.
15. 'The general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory action as amounting to
expropriation. Regulatory conduct by public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of legitimate
complaint under Article 1110 of the NAFTA, although the Tribunal does not rule our the
possibility." SD Myers at para 281.
An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an o%ner to make
use of its economic rights although it may be that, in some contexts and circumstances, it
would be appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it
were partial or temporary.
Id at para 283.
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In particular, the Chapter 11 damages requirement is the area which potentially
makes the "hard case" difficult to commence and to succeed on. Although an investor
is only required to provide prima facie evidence of damage when it makes the initial
claim, this could potentially be a difficult task if the investment at issue has been
proven to be hazardous. The fundamental question one must ask-what is the value
of an investment that hurts people?
Under principles of valuation in international law, the seminal Permanent Court
of International Justice Cborzow Factory case provides that the injured party be put
back in the position it would have been in but for the illegal act of the state.16 This
basic principle was applied in the Iran-US Claims Tribunal cases. In those cases, there
were a number of examples where companies that were affected by the Iranian
revolution itself were not awarded their full claims for compensation, in particular
based on goodwill and future profits, despite the fact the tribunal held the investment
was expropriated.
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal made it clear in its awards that the revolution in
Iran was a factor that had to be taken into account although it was not in itself a
justification for compensation. In addition, numerous tribunals held that, in valuing
an investment, a tribunal must disregard the "effects of the very act of nationalization"
and the "effects of actions taken by the nationalizing State in relation to the enterprise
which actions may have depressed its value."'17 In other words, the test for valuation is
what a willing buyer would have paid to a willing seller disregarding any diminution in
value due to the illegal act itself. This key value question relates to what the
investment was worth the day before the expropriation, not after.
By applying these basic damages principles, it appears that even if there is a
nominal breach of a NAFTA Chapter 11 treatment obligation, if the product or
investment is legitimately a health or environmental hazard, and this was known
before the expropriation, it would be difficult to assert that on the day of
expropriation the investment had any value. It would be unlikely that a NAFTA
Chapter 11 tribunal would either let the claim get past ajurisdictional challenge or, if
it did, a tribunal would likely deny the investor the ability to collect compensation in a
final award.
Amongst other discouragements to investors trying to collect on the
expropriation of their hazardous investment, there is the real risk that such an
investor would be obliged to pay the substantial costs of such an international
16. 'The essential principle ... is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences
of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act
had not been committed." Germany v Poland, 17 PCIJ Ser A 3,47 (1928).
17. American InternationalGroup, Inc v Iran, Award No 93-2-3 (Dec 19, 1983), reprinted in 4 Iran-US
CTR 96, 106-07. The question of taking into account prior political, social and economic changes
may also be relevant. It would be difficult for a claimant to argue that it would not have expected
that its product would be banned if it actually injured people.
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arbitration process, including the cost of the arbitrators and the professional fees of
the other disputing party.
In addition, it should be noted that foreign companies do not lightly sue the
governments of their host countries. As can be evidenced by the attempts of the
Mexican and Canadian governments to set aside in Canadian domestic courts their
losses in Metaklad and SD Myers, governments do not easily acquiesce when an
independent international tribunal exposes discriminatory and arbitrary state conduct.
The bringing of a claim always follows an extreme situation in which the claimant has
attempted other non-legal routes and been rebuffed. The SD Myers case is a typical
example of an investor facing the manifest protectionist intent of a government
measure and suffering damages as a result.

IV.

THE SKY IS FALLING ON FREE TRADE

Governments make mistakes and sometimes they intentionally create measures
that hurt foreigners. That is the history of international disputes. It is misguided
reasoning to think that holding governments accountable is a threat to democracy. It
is not difficult to conceive that government officials, with no doubt the best intentions
to protect citizen welfare, will violate international trade provisions. It is not
frequent-the number of cases from the past seven years shows this-but it happens
and will no doubt continue to happen in the future. That is why we need provisions
like NAFTA Chapter 11. Foreign investors should be compensated for unfair and
discriminatory treatment, and they should be confident that they can operate in a
predictable business environment based on the rule of law. This is a small price, if any
price at all, to pay for the numerous benefits of international trade and investment.
Is the sky falling?. No, certainly not for democracy or state sovereignty. The real
risk is that rational debate about free trade and investment will be stifled under the
weight of anti-free trade hysteria. Perhaps it is time for a little more "force and
determination" from North American governments, as advocated by Tony Blair, and
a rational and informed debate on the real risks and benefits of international trade and
investment.
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